I analyze changes in apparel company stock prices when Michelle Obama wears designer outfits at major events. The First Lady's selections can create value exceeding $100 million for companies that design and market her clothing. The effect is approximately $2.3 billion during a 2009 European trip that the media labeled a "fashion faceoff" with her French counterpart Carla Bruni. However, firms whose clothing she chooses not to wear see their stock prices drop, and her net impact upon the industry amounts to a redistribution of value among firms. The First Lady's influence on fashion firms represents a private benefit of public office, similar to private benefits of control obtained by corporate managers.
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The Michelle Markup:
The First Lady's impact on stock prices of fashion companies
I Introduction
This paper analyzes how apparel company stock prices react when Michelle Obama makes public appearances wearing designer outfits. The First Lady's wardrobe seems wellsuited to a finance event study, because a cadre of followers anticipates, catalogues, and critiques her ensembles, providing publicity that could create substantial gains for firms in the clothing industry. The First Lady wears designs from a wide circle of suppliers, and considerable uncertainty about the identity of her outfitter precedes her appearances at important events.
I find that designer and retailer firms' stock prices rise significantly when Michelle Obama wears their clothing. In the 14-month period from November 2008 to December 2009, my estimates indicate that her public appearances led to gains exceeding $2.6 billion in shareholder value for various clothiers, in a pattern that tracks her daily schedule. Her true impact is almost certainly greater, because many apparel companies are not publicly traded and we cannot study how their market value increases when the First Lady wears their clothing.
However, I also find an opposite result for those fashion companies whose clothes are not worn by the First Lady on major public occasions: these firms experience losses in their stock values 1 Research on private benefits of control includes two seminal papers on the premiums paid by acquirers of large blocks of stock (Barclay and Holderness, 1989, and Dyck and Zingales, 2004) , as well as approximately a dozen papers on the differential values of high-vote and low-vote stock issued by the same firm (see, e.g., Zingales, 1994) . Related research has studied managers' media attention (Malmedier and Tate, 2009 ) and high-valued perquisites (Yermack, 2006) . A series of papers beginning with LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) compares the approaches of different nations' legal systems to reducing private benefits of control, attempting to show connections between these regulations, the development of capital markets, and economic growth.
2 by about 0.4% just after events when the First Lady overlooks their designs. On balance, Michelle Obama's impact upon the fashion industry appears to represent a pattern of value redistribution, rather than value creation.
The First Lady derives no direct financial benefit from the value she creates for apparel companies. However, she has the opportunity to influence trends in contemporary fashion and to promote the careers of designers whose creations she finds appealing. The prestige and visibility of her position enables the First Lady to confer these benefits upon clothiers, and her exercise of this influence is analogous to CEOs and large shareholders exercising the private benefits of control in the corporate world.
Private benefits of control have become a significant research issue in finance. As Dyck and Zingales (2004) discuss, the concept first appeared in a theory paper by Grossman and Hart (1980) and has become widely used to explain patterns of equity valuation, executive compensation, and related topics, in both inter-company and cross-country research. 1 Private benefits of control include not only the cash flows from dividends and compensation, but also the intangible value of prestige, power, and public visibility enjoyed by CEOs and major shareholders. Extending the concept of private benefits of control to political figures seems straightforward, since they obtain intangible benefits of prestige, power and publicity similar to those enjoyed by corporate managers.
I propose calling these rents the private benefits of public office. Research has begun to identify and value these benefits in various forms, such as the superior stock trading profits earned by U.S. Senators (Ziobrowski et. al, 2004 ) and election-related value increases for companies whose board members are ex-politicians (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009 France. Even when she makes routine public visits to theaters, schools, and soup kitchens around Washington, Michelle Obama creates millions of dollars of shareholder value for certain fashion firms, whose stock rises about 0.5% when she wears an outfit in public, and about 2.3%
when the occasion is a prominent political or diplomatic ceremony.
The First Lady's influence upon the apparel industry follows a longstanding pattern in 4 which the tastes of major political figures have fueled demand for products among the public. Erdogan (1999) cites Queen Victoria's 19 th century association with Cadbury as one of the earliest known commercial endorsements. American examples include the iconic "teddy bear" stuffed toys, which were inspired by a cartoon about Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 and manufactured with the president's consent, and the James Bond spy thrillers, which took off in popularity after a spontaneous endorsement by John F. Kennedy in a magazine interview.
Neither Roosevelt nor Kennedy (nor, I assume, Queen Victoria) received commissions for promoting these products, and I do not suggest that Michelle Obama obtains financial profits from her influence over contemporary fashion. Rather, her selections of designers and brands appear credible to the public precisely because of the absence of financial conflicts of interest, which typically cloud the value of paid celebrity endorsements.
While illustrating certain private benefits of public office, this paper also complements existing research in both finance and marketing. The close link between share prices and the First Lady's wardrobe provides insight into wealth creation in an industry in which the sources of economic value -public trends and attitudes about fashion -are intangible, fast-changing, and difficult to control or preserve. The large magnitudes of wealth redistribution tied to Michelle Obama's outfits suggest that credible celebrity endorsements can be much more valuable than estimated in studies such as Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) (Talley, 2009 ).
In interviews she rarely mentions individual designers. Instead, she seems more interested in publicizing her connections to mass-market retailers, having referred in different interviews to shopping trips at Target, Gap, and J. Crew. I contacted the White House press office to ask whether the First Lady considered the impact of her fashion selections upon the value of different companies, but in a reply E-mail I was told simply that "we do not comment on the First Lady's fashion selections." A 2009 appraisal by The New York Times fashion critic suggests that Michelle Obama's comments about mid-market retailers are a ruse to deflect scrutiny from the elite nature of her wardrobe:
"Mrs. Obama's choices are all insider, apart from her shorts and those strategically worn plebe numbers from Target and Talbots. If she got any more insider, she'd be backing down a runway. She wears Rodarte, Jason Wu, Sophie Theallet, Narciso Rodriguez, Thakoon, Isabel Toledo and Rick Owens, labels that in terms of creativity and price are at the highest level of fashion. Go much higher and you hit couture" (Horyn, 2009 ).
However, the same critic also notes that the First Lady had earned a reputation for independence and judiciousness, ignoring trends to identify quality designers on her own:
"In Mrs. Obama, the fashion industry has found a woman it can admire but cannot completely possess. That's because she doesn't favor only one designer or a clique, as her predecessors did. Also, she avoids the appearance of being cozy with designers. That's why she's often described in terms reserved for a 1930s screen goddess: 'regal' and 'dazzling,' a woman not to be contended with so much as worshiped from afar" (Horyn, 2009 ). For each outfit, I identify the parent companies that have partial or complete equity 3 U.S. copyright law protects manufacturers' logos against copying but does not protect designs themselves, a position that is at odds with the more extensive copyright regimes of many other countries. The U.S. regulatory posture is the subject of an ongoing legislative debate which has divided the fashion industry itself. See Hemphill and Suk (2009). 9 interest in the firm that designs the garment and controls its intellectual property rights, if any. Table 1 , I analyze 368 company-date observations in which a publicly listed firm is credited as either the designer, retailer or both (most event days involve multiple firms, sometimes one designer and as many as three or four retailers). These observations involve 29 companies, 23 of which are U.S.-based and six of which trade on overseas stock exchanges. The database would grow by many hundreds of additional observations if I tracked privately controlled firms in each of these categories, but because I am interested in stock price impacts I do not tabulate this data. Table 1 lists the sample companies, their home countries, and the total number appearances of each firm in the database overall and in each category. I identify an additional 27 major apparel companies, 21 from the U.S. and 6 international, whose outfits are not worn by the First Lady during the sample period (some of them outfitted her earlier, on the presidential campaign trail). These firms are obtained the roster of the Council of Fashion Designers of America (CFDA) and lists of major public fashion companies. I include these firms in my analysis of stock prices as a control sample as I describe more fully below. Table 2 lists the 18 most significant public appearances by the First Lady during the sample period, which I choose based upon their visibility and political importance. These events generally involve major political meetings, ceremonies, or summit meetings with foreign leaders.
III Data description
My analysis of fashion stocks' responses to Michelle Obama
The importance of most of these events, such as the Presidential inauguration, the G20 summit, and a White House state dinner, should be self-evident to the reader. All of these events received especially wide publicity, many of them on live national television, often with great attention by commentators to Michelle Obama's wardrobe selections. I will focus on these occasions especially for measuring the impact of the First Lady's outfits upon company stock prices. The right column of Table 2 lists the designer and main outfit worn on each occasion.
IV Analysis
I conduct event studies to determine whether fashion company stock prices react significantly when Michelle Obama wears their garments in public. For the 29 designer and retailer companies that have commercial associations with the First Lady's wardrobe, as well as the 27 additional apparel firms that do not, I pool the observations and estimate a one-factor market model regression of the following form, with standard errors clustered by company:
In the equation, R it is the return on company i's stock on day t, Rm is the return on the relevant market index (which varies across firms depending upon the home country of each company), δ is an indicator variable that equals 1 for days in an event window around the time that the First Lady wears a particular company's clothing, and ε is an error term. Switzerland, Italy, and Korea, and I do not have data for anything other than the overall market index for firms outside the U.S. As a robustness check, I reestimate the main models below in a four-factor specification using only observations for U.S.-listed stocks, and I obtain very similar results. Finally, there is strong reason to believe that the returns of the 56 stocks are correlated due to the commercial relationships that exist among them, so estimating abnormal returns in a single pooled regression permits clustering of standard errors to control for correlations of the error term among and within firms. by much of the press, were televised worldwide and caused newspapers everywhere to publish evaluations of the two women's wardrobes.
During the European trip, Michelle Obama wore outfits by several designers, and the stock prices of eight public companies, seven U.S. and one Swiss, stood to gain from their status as designers or retailers of the First Lady's ensembles. Figure 2 shows the results from a strategy of investing $1.00 in each of these eight firms' stocks at closing prices on March 30, the day prior to the trip. Note that such a strategy would not have been possible to implement without advance inside knowledge of the First Lady's clothing selections. The figure shows that the eight stocks rose dramatically in sync with one another as worldwide interest in the trip increased. The eight firms' gains over the week ranged from 10% (Talbots) to 35% (Saks) and averaged 15.5%. I searched news archives for confounding events at either the firm or industry level that might explain these rapid gains in share values but found none -in fact, one company (Macy's) saw its shares rise in spite of a debt downgrade. By comparison, the S&P500 index, shown also in Figure 2 , gained 6.1% in a market rally during the same period. The net creation of shareholder value for the eight firms was approximately $2.3 billion when compared to increases in the S&P500. More than half of the value gain went to Compagnie Financière Richemont SA, the Geneva-based owner of the Paris fashion house of designer Azzadine Alaia.
Michelle Obama wore an Alaia dress to the dinner held April 3 for NATO leaders and their spouses and was praised for the diplomatic gesture of choosing a French design. She also wore an Alaia cardigan two days earlier to tea with the Queen at Buckingham Palace.
While some companies benefit dramatically from Michelle Obama's patronage, others are overlooked. Among the dozens of firms in the fashion industry, a large majority will be excluded from her wardrobe selections at any one event. For the 18 major events identified in Table 2 , I identify the set of companies whose garments are not selected by the First Lady on 
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each occasion and test whether her omissions lead to revaluation of these firms' share prices. Table 4 indicates that these companies lose value. Data on the left shows that for trading windows of length one through five days, company stock prices rise by approximately 2.0% if the First Lady wears their outfits, while data on the right shows a drop of about 0.4% in the shares of firms that she bypasses. These data indicate that transfers of value takes place, rather than organic creation of value, when the First Lady favors a particular designer or retailer.
Even though she captures none of it herself, the value projected onto fashion stocks by Michelle Obama dwarfs the earnings of any international celebrity or product endorser.
According to Forbes magazine's most recent rankings, the highest-paid celebrity in the world is Oprah Winfrey at $275 million annually, the highest-earning fashion model is Giselle Bundchen at $35 million, and only a small group of models earn as much as $5 million a year. 5 The data would seem to support one of two interpretations: either that top celebrity endorsers are seriously underpaid, or alternatively, that Michelle Obama would rank at the top of such lists, very far ahead of anyone else, if she received fair market compensation for choosing and wearing her outfits.
Foreign trips provide an opportunity to test whether advance leakage of the First Lady's planned wardrobe occurs, potentially providing an opportunity for informed trading in apparel stocks in advance of her public appearances. Such speculation would seem more likely for foreign trips than domestic appearances, because her wardrobe needs to be packed at least several days in advance prior to traveling overseas, and a number of assistants and security personnel probably have advance knowledge of the outfits selected. The White House press office declined to respond to my question about whether any attempt is made to keep wardrobe selections confidential. I check for the possibility of a run-up in firms' stock prices prior to dates of Michelle Obama's major public appearances, both in the U.S. and abroad, and find no evidence that share prices advance before she wears companies' garments in public; returns for these firms are actually slightly negative in the two days prior to the event day.
V Discussion of Michelle Obama's private benefits of public office
In measuring the value impact of Michelle Obama upon the fashion industry, I seek to identify an implicit personal benefit of her public service, the ability to send signals to the marketplace that channel billions of dollars of value toward those designers that she admires. I do not suggest that she obtains any of this value personally in any form other than the psychic rewards from seeing the careers of her favorite oufitters flourish.
Nevertheless, the value stream created by the First Lady's wardrobe is so large that one wonders if she might benefit from it at least indirectly. Such an attempt was made by one of Michelle Obama's predecessors, Nancy Reagan, who received gifts of expensive designer gowns, sometimes valued as high as $20,000 each, and then wore the garments at public events during her husband's administration. Controversy arose when the Reagans did not disclose or pay taxes on the gifts. Mrs. Reagan responded to her critics by characterizing the transfers as "loans" and promising to donate some of the garments to museums. When criticism did not abate, she declared that she would end altogether her practice of borrowing gowns (Smith, 1982) , but she nevertheless continued it quietly, without making required disclosures, throughout her eight years in the White House (Lamar, Peterzell and Traver, 1988) . Designers who received publicity from Mrs. Reagan wearing their creations appear to have been pleased to cooperate in these arrangements; one told The New York Times in 1988 that "It's wonderful. She's been a sensation for my business" (Roberts, 1988) . However, Michelle Obama appears not to have followed any such practice involving gifts or loans of clothing, as she has categorically stated in many interviews that she purchases her entire wardrobe.
Campaign contributions represent another potential source of indirect benefits to the First Lady, since donations may assist in securing and prolonging her tenure. I search Federal
Election Commission disclosures at www.opensecrets.org to obtain patterns of contributions by Michelle Obama's favorite designers or top executives of designer firms. Results appear in Table 5 , which tabulates donations in three columns: which candidate a donor supported financially in the 2008 presidential primaries, which candidate he supported in the 2008 general election, and whether the donor contributed to party organizations such as Congressional or Senatorial campaign committees. Firms are ordered according to the number of times each designer appears in my database, and not all may legally contribute to any candidate because not all are U.S. citizens. In the first two columns, federal law limits gifts to individual candidates to $2,300, and all donations recorded in the table were for that maximum amount. There is no limit on donations to party-wide campaign organizations.
Data in the first two columns of Table 5 
VII Conclusions
This paper studies how the wardrobe choices of First Lady Michelle Obama cause redistributions of value among firms in the apparel industry. I find that stock prices of designer and retailer companies rise significantly when the First Lady wears their outfits in public, and 24 that the increases are greatest for major public appearances such as summit meetings or addresses to Congress. These gains occur for both U.S. and foreign countries, and for both retailers and designers. However, fashion companies suffer losses in shareholder value when the First Lady bypasses them and does not wear their designs to a major public event.
The First Lady obtains no financial benefit from her influence upon the fashion industry, but she clearly has considerable power to promote certain companies or designers. This ability, which is partly due to her visibility in the role of First Lady, represents an economic rent that seems similar to the private benefits of control enjoyed by corporate managers. Table 4 Cumulative abnormal stock returns after major public appearances by Michelle Obama The table shows cumulative abnormal stock returns for 56 apparel companies around the dates of 18 major public events attended by First Lady Michelle Obama. The left half of the table shows data for 57 company-day observations for cases in which the First Lady wore an outfit or accessory for which the firm is either designer, retailer, or both. The right half of the table shows data for 912 company-day observations on days when a major event occurred but none of the company's garments were worn by the First Lady. Each event window begins on t 0 , the day of the appearance, although it is shifted forward one day if the event occurs in the late afternoon or evening after the stock market is closed. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated from a one-factor model using the market index from the home country of each fashion company. Events and garments are identified from Internet fashion blogs. Major events are those listed in Table 2 . 
